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Abstract
Traditional and new trade theories predict increasing specialization in ex-
ports as tariffs are reduced. This paper investigates the empirical link between
trade integration, institutions and export specialization. We study the evolu-
tion of export specialization in thirteen Central European countries over the
period 1989-2000 as a result of decreasing tariffs and institutional reforms. Our
results indicate that a reduction in tariffs between EU15 and Central Europe
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1 Introduction
The new economic geography theory described by Krugman (2000) suggests that
trade integration leads to agglomeration and specialization of economic activities.
Krugman (2000) suggests that adverse sectorial shocks in major fields of activity
might exert major economic consequences in terms of aggregate activity, employ-
ment and workers’ displacement. In other words, the evolution of economic spe-
cialization is an important macroeconomic issue since the degree of specialization
reflects the exposure of the country (or the region) to important external sectorial
shocks.
The process of trade integration between the European union and Central and East
European countries (CEECs) during the nineties offers us an unique opportunity
to analyze the relationship between trade integration and export specialization. In
addition, a growing literature emphasizes the importance of appropriate domestic
institutions and policies ((Acemoglu et al. 2005a), (Golub et al. 2006) and (Dollar &
Kraay 2003)). Countries with market-friendly policies and strong institutions have
stronger economic performances. Therefore, the impact of institutional reforms on
export specialization in Central Europe will be studied in this paper as well.
This paper will extend the literature in several ways. In previous studies on trade
integration mostly a linear time trend was used to capture the integration process
like in (a.o. Hildebrandt & Wo¨rz (2004), Traistaru et al. (2003)). Trefler (2004) and
Beine & Coulombe (2007) instead use changes in tariffs to capture trade integration
between two industrialized countries, Canada and the United States. We follow this
approach when studying trade integration between 13 former transition countries
and the EU during the period 1989-20001. In addition, the impact of two major insti-
tutional reforms on export specialization in these Central European countries will be
investigated: enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms. These variables are
1Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey
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measured by indices to capture reforms in legislation, institutions and enforcement.
Enterprise reforms indicates to what extent a country has implemented appropri-
ate credit and subsidy policies and bankruptcy legislation, while competition policy
reforms measures whether actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power and
reduce entry restrictions to most markets. Furthermore, specialization in exports
will be measured by a herfindahl index of export specialization as in most studies on
industrial specialization. Using a dynamic panel model, we are able to disentangle
the effect of changes in tariffs with the EU15 on changes in export specialization in
Central Europe in the long- and short-run. This is important because a shock in
tariffs can not be expected to have the same immediate and long-run effects.
Our results lead us to conclude that EU15-tariff reductions resulted in significantly
more long-run export specialization in Central Europe. Also we find institutional
reforms to be highly significant in speeding up export specialization. Although
specialization makes countries more vulnerable to the effect of shocks, the effect
depends on which sector the country is specialized in (Amable 2000).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on the
relationship between trade integration, institutions and export specialization and
section 3 shows some stylized facts. Section 4 explains the methodology, while sec-
tion 5 describes the data. Section 6 discusses the benchmark results and robustness
checks. Finally, section 8 discusses the results and section 9 briefly concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Trade Integration and Export Specialization
Traditional trade theories predict a negative relationship between trade costs and
specialization. More particular, trade liberalization has been shown to result in
increasing specialization in sectors where a country has a comparative advantage
because of differences in technology or factor endowments. On the other hand,
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the new economic geography literature focuses on geography and agglomeration as
driving forces of specialization patterns. Forces that drive agglomeration are called
centripetal forces and use forward and backward linkages. A forward linkage or
cost linkage is at stake when firms want to be located close to firms supplying in-
termediate goods to reduce their production costs. The presence of firms using
intermediate goods raises sales of intermediate goods suppliers, this is the back-
ward linkage or demand linkage (De Bruyne 2004). Forces in the opposite direction
of agglomeration, dispersion of activities, are centrifugal forces such as factor and
product market competition. A region with many firms will have high labor demand
and high wages (factor market competition). In addition, this region will have to
divide local demand between many firms (product market competition) (Baldwin
et al. 1999). Using a model with only geography and agglomeration and no tradi-
tional differences in endowments, Baldwin et al. (1999) find that this model predicts
increasing regional specialization as trade costs are reduced.
On the empirical side, economists provide evidence of increasing specialization in
Western Europe ((Amiti 1999), (Brulhart 1998)) and Central and East Europe.
Traistaru et al. (2003) came to the conclusion that economic integration leads to
higher regional specialization in 5 Eastern European countries2 during the period
1990-1999. Similarly, the study by Hildebrandt & Wo¨rz (2004) shows for 8 Central
and East European countries3 greater industrial specialization during the period
1993-2000. One drawback of these studies is usually that economic integration is
captured merely by a time trend assuming that trade integration is a linear process.
In contrast, Trefler (2004) and Beine & Coulombe (2007) measure trade policy by
tariffs. Trefler (2004) provides evidence that a free trade agreement (FTA) between
the US and Canada leads to trade creation, increased labor productivity, but re-
duced employment for manufacturing workers in Canada. Beine & Coulombe (2007)
suggest that trade liberalization between Canadian regions and the US resulted in
2Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia
3Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia
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more regional export specialization for Canada in the short-run, but less regional
export specialization in the long-run. The authors show that trade liberalization
leads to specialization of activities in a region in the short-run, but better access to
suppliers and customers or positive spillovers may trigger other industries to locate
in the involved region and induce diversification of economic activities.
While Trefler (2004) and Beine & Coulombe (2007) studied export specialization
between two industrialized countries, this paper will apply their method to the
trade integration process between the EU15 and 13 transition countries4. Therefore,
we will also take into account other elements from this transition process such as
institutional reforms.
2.2 Institutional Reforms and Export Specialization
In addition to the literature on trade integration, there is a growing literature on the
importance of institutions for trade. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) show that
Western countries with better access to the Atlantic and Atlantic ports had higher
growth rates than Eastern European countries. Moreover, they suggest that coun-
tries with stronger political institutions, property rights and economic institutions
traded more and spurred economic growth. In a more general framework, Acemoglu
et al. (2005a) explain that economic institutions shape and stimulate incentives of
economic actors to invest, to innovate or organize production. Therefore institutions
determine the economic outcome of a country and countries with stronger economic
institutions will have a higher growth rate. On the other hand, Dollar & Kraay
(2003) argue that trade and institutions have an impact on growth on the long run,
but institutions do not matter for growth in the short run. In contrast, Francois &
Manchin (2007) find that basic infrastructure and institutional quality matter more
than tariffs for exports. Similar, Jansen & Nordas (2004) suggest that countries
with better institutions trade more.
4Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey
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We will study the empirical relation between institutional reforms and export spe-
cialization in Central Europe using two measures of institutional reforms: gover-
nance and enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms. This has to our
knowledge not been addressed in the literature before.
3 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document the trends of the main variables from our regression
analysis in section 4.
3.1 Trade Integration
The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 gave rise to the transition from a plan-
economy to a market-economy in Central and East European countries (CEECs).
This process broke down the artificial trading relationships amongst Central Eu-
ropean countries. Since trade amongst CEECs accounted for 50 percent of their
total export before transition, this collapse is known as one of the primary causes
of the output fall. For these countries the key to recovery was the ability to reori-
ent their trade structure to Western countries. Rodrik (1992) observes that export
growth to the EU expanded over the period 1990-1996. According to Repkine &
Walsh (1999) some products already traded with Western Europe before transition,
while other products were sold only into the Soviet Union. These pre-transition
EU-products made an easy transition to private ownership and efficient structures.
On average the EU15 was the main trading partner of Central Europe during the
period 1989-2000 as shown in Figure 1.
Not only directed the CEECs their exports more towards the European Union, but
also the European Union allowed tariffs to decrease gradually during that period.
Moreover, Rodrik (1992) observes that average tariffs were already low before 1989
relative to countries at similar levels of development. Figure 2 plots the average
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Figure 1: Average export share of the 5 largest trading partners of CEECs (%),
1989-2000
Source: UN (1993, 1997, 2002)
unweighted tariff of the EU15 over time. The average tariff shows two major drops
in time, 1994 and 1997.
By 1994 most countries5 had signed a Europe agreement with the EU15 which
was a bilateral agreement to decrease tariffs. These agreements might explain the
first large drop in tariffs in 1994 as illustrated in Figure 2. The second large tariff
drop occurred between 1996-1997 and could be explained by the official start of
the enlargement process in 1997-1998 when Central Europe adopted the European
legislation. One of the chapters of this legislation deals with free movement of goods
and establishing a free trade area with the EU15. In may 2004, 10 countries became
a EU-member6, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007.
5Poland and Hungary were the first to sign the Europe agreement in 1991, Czech Republic,
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia followed in 1993, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed their Europe
agreement in 1995 and finally in 1996 Slovenia signed the Europe agreement. Turkey, Malta and
Cyprus signed the association agreement already in 1963, 1970 and 1972 respectively
6Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania
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Figure 2: Trade liberalization (%)
3.2 Institutional Reform
During the nineties, Central Europe made considerable reforms in institutions and
policies. Due to data availability, we use two measures for institutional reforms,
enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms, to verify to what extent insti-
tutional reforms in addition to trade integration matter for export specialization.
Figure 3 suggests that during the period of our analysis, both types of institutional
reforms show a clear positive trend. But we also observe that for the whole period,
enterprise reforms were stronger than competition policy reforms and in addition the
variable enterprise reforms shows more variation than competition policy reforms.
3.3 Export Specialization
In Figure 4 we show the evolution of the average export specialization for the 13
Central European countries over time. We measure export specialization by an
herfindahl index on exports which will be explained in more detail in section 5.
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Figure 3: Average institutional reforms for all CEECs
Figure 4: Average export specialization for all CEECs
Data for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia is only available from 1992 onwards. Data for
Slovakia is available since 1993.
9
The index lies between 0 and 1. The interpretation is as follows: a higher value of
the index refers to more export specialization, whereas a herfindahl index closer to
zero points out more export diversification. Figure 4 seems to indicate that export
specialization is not a monotonic process. The figure illustrates that in the early
nineties average export specialization increased sharply, probably because countries
started to exploit their natural resources after transition. After 1992, export spe-
cialization decreases which could indicate that the CEECs started exporting in more
and new sectors. While after 1997, export specialization increases again, suggesting
that the number of sectors the countries are exporting in, went down.
4 Methodology
In order to investigate the relationship between trade integration and export spe-
cialization, we build on the approach proposed by Beine & Coulombe (2007) which
relies on the estimation of a dynamic panel model:
∆log(Exp spec.i,t) = αi + δt + φ1log(Exp spec.i,t−1) + φ2log(tariffji,t−1) (1)
+φ3∆log(tariffji,t) + φ4Ii,t + φ′5Zi,t + ²i,t (2)
where i is a Central or East European country in a certain year t. Exp spec.i,t is
export specialization measured by a Herfindahl based on annual sectoral trade flows
from Central Europe to the EU15. Country fixed effects, αi, control for unobserved
country-specific effects and δt are time dummies controlling for a common shock.
Tariffji,t are the tariffs from the EU15 (j) on exports from a Central and Eastern
European country i. This measure is based on sectoral tariffs and aggregated to
the country level. Ii,t captures the level of a country’s institutional reforms, Zi,t is
a vector of other control variables such as business cycles and ²i,t is an error term.
The definition of the variables will be clarified in more detail in section 5.
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This model is estimated with OLS7 and Newey-West robust standard errors of pa-
rameter estimates to take into account serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The
dynamic feature of the model is important because it disentangles the short-run from
the long-run effects of trade integration. The short-run is captured by φ3 while the
long run is given by −φ2φ1 . The decomposition of the effect of trade integration be-
tween a short- and a long-run component is important since a shock in tariffs can
have an immediate effect, but export adjustments in response to a shock in tariffs
will also show up after some time.
5 Data
In equation (1) the degree of export specialization (Exp spec.) is a function of
trade weighted tariffs (tariff), institutional reforms (I) and other control variables
(Z), business cycles and alternatives for the tariff variable. This section gives an
overview of the data and variables.
5.1 Export Specialization
A common measure for export specialization in the literature is the herfindahl index
on exports (Sapir 1996)8. The evolution of the herfindahl index of export special-
ization might reveal to what extent a given country is becoming more specialized or
diversified, regardless of how the economic structures of other countries are evolving.
7GMM is not used since the time series are too short to instrument the variables by 2 or more
lags.
8We investigate here the degree of the so-called absolute specialization, i.e. the extent to what
a given country or region is specialized in a limited number of activities. This concept of special-
ization directly relates to the concept of risk exposure. This contrast with relative specialization
which measures to what extent the export or production structure differs from those of the other
(contingent) countries or regions. The latter notion of specialization is often measured by the K-
spec index and might be used as an indicator of heterogeneity of export or production structures
within a given geographical area.
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The herfindahl is computed for each country i and each year t as the sum of squared
export shares over all industries within one country.
Exp. spec.i,t =
J∑
k=1
(ski,t)
2 (3)
where ski,t = exports
k
i,t/
J∑
k=1
exportski,t
A higher index indicates that the country exports in a smaller range of sectors and
hence is more specialized. To construct the herfindahl indices, yearly export flows
from 13 individual countries of Central and East Europe to the European Union
on the 8-digit HS classification9 product level were collected from Eurostat10for the
period 1989-20001112. Using a correspondence key, the data was translated to the
4-digit NACE industry level13 (250 sectors). Note that we study only trade flows to
and tariffs from the EU15 since they are the main trading partner of the CEECs as
illustrated in Figure 1.
5.2 Trade Integration
In contrast to previous studies on trade integration, we will not use time dummies,
but rather tariffs to measure trade integration. We use yearly tariffs of the EU15 on
the HS 8-digit product level from the Haveman database. These data are available
from 1989 until 2000. Only the preferential rates of a product for the individual
Central and East European countries was used but when this was not available, we
used the MFN (most favored nations) rates. Not all tariffs were available for all
years and all products14, therefore we replaced the missing tariff at time t with the
9The Harmonized system (HS) is a classification system we use at the 8-digit product level
10The Eurostat trade statistics is a high quality database containing annual data on trade flows
to and from Central and East European countries.
11For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia data was available from 1992 onwards and for
Slovakia from 1993 onwards.
12Note that we collected trade data for all sectors, not only the manufacturing sector
13NACE is a European classification system.
14Only the years 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000 were available for most products.
12
tariff value at t+ 115.
The sectoral tariffs τk of the EU15 on exports from Central and East European
countries are aggregated to the country level using the export share of the industry
in total export as weights wki :
tariffji,t =
J∑
k=1
wki,tτ
k
t (4)
with weight wki = exports
i
k/
J∑
k=1
exportsik
In section 6 regression results using different weights will be illustrated to test the
robustness of the trade weighted tariff measure.Furthermore, two alternative mea-
sures for tariffs are used: trade liberalization and price liberalization. These vari-
ables from the EBRD reports16 indicate to what extent a country has price or export
restrictions (see appendix 11).
5.3 Institutional reforms
The transition process implied a drastic institutional change in Central Europe.
Since Acemoglu et al. (2005a) suggest a causal relation between institutions and
economic performance, institutional reforms will be our third variable of interest.
Data were collected from the EBRD on 2 indicators of institutional reforms: enter-
prise reforms and competition policy reforms. These transition indicators reflect the
judgement of the EBRD about country-specific progress in enterprise and competi-
tion policy reforms. Each country gets a score between 1 and 4.33 where 1 represents
little or no change from a centrally planned market and 4.33 indicates that the stan-
dards of an industrialized market economy are implemented. The scores are based
on the classification system in Table 1.
15Estimations where we replaced the missing tariff at time t with the tariff value of time t − 1
did not change results
16not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey
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Table 1: Institutional reforms
score enterprise reforms
1 if there are soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening
financial discipline at the enterprise level) and few other reforms are made
to promote corporate governance.
2 if there is a moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement
of bankruptcy legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition
and corporate governance.
3 if significant and sustained actions are taken to harden budget constraints (tight credit
and subsidy policy) and to promote corporate governance effectively.
4 if substantial improvement is made in corporate governance
and significant new investment at the enterprise level.
4.33 if there are standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies:
effective corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions
and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring.
score competition policy reforms
1 if there are no competition legislation and institutions.
2 if competition legislation and institutions are set up and there is some
reduction of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms.
3 if some enforcement actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power
and to promote a competitive environment.
4 if significant enforcement actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power
and to promote a competitive environment.
4.33 if there are standards and performance norms typical of advanced industrial economies:
effective enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.
Source: EBRD reports
Note: the EBRD indicators are not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
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Where the enterprise reforms indicator focuses on reducing production subsidies,
introducing effective bankruptcy procedures at the enterprise level, the competition
policy reforms indicator concentrates on facilitating market entry and combating the
abuse of market dominance by monopolies. The average score on enterprise reforms
for all countries is 3, indicating that on average actions are taken to tighten credit
and subsidy policies and introducing effective bankruptcy procedures. The average
score on competition policy for all countries for the period 1989-2000 is lower, namely
2. This means that on average a competition legislation and institution has been
set up, but there is no effective enforcement of reducing entry restrictions and abuse
of dominant firms.
A disadvantage of these indicators is that for some countries the variable does not
vary much over time. Secondly, the reforms indicators reflect the assessments of
EBRD country economists using the general criteria in Table 1.
5.4 Other control Variables
First, to control for business cycles in individual Central and East European coun-
tries and the EU15, GDP data (EBRD reports, IMF database) are decomposed in
a growth trend and a cyclical component, the business cycle, with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter.17
Secondly, the economic freedom index reports an index for hidden import barri-
ers (HIB) other than published tariffs and quotas18. Since correlation between the
hidden import barriers index and our variable for trade weighted tariffs is low (corre-
lation = 0.0136), this variable can be included complementary to the tariff variable.
This will allow us to control for other tariffs, non-tariff barriers or quotas that are
17Maravall & del Rio (2001) and Pedersen (2001) suggest that the smoothing parameter of the
filter should be between 6 and 14 for annual data. Higher values produce smoother results. In this
analysis, we will use a value of 7 for the smoothing parameter. Results with a smooth value of 14
are not reported here, but are similar.
18HIB is only available for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 on a country-level
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not captured by the tariff variable.
6 Results
Table 2 reports the main OLS estimation results of regression (1). Column (1) shows
the results of a regression with tariffs, control variables for the business cycle, coun-
try and time fixed effects. Since the year dummies are not significant and do not
change the result, they will not be included anymore in the following regressions19.
Regressions (2) and (3) report the institutional reforms variables enterprise reforms
and competition policy reforms separately20 and reduce the analysis to 10 countries
since the institutional reforms variables are not available for Malta, Cyprus and
Turkey. The regressions in columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 2 deal with possi-
ble econometric problems. First, since the weights of the tariff variable could be
endogeneously correlated with the herfindahl index of exports, regression (4) uses
constant weights (average export share over the period 1989-2000) in the tariff vari-
able. The disadvantage of this constant weight is the loss of variation over time.
Therefore, column (5) in Table 2 uses the weight of the tariff variable lagged by 1
period. Finally, the lagged export specialization variable could be correlated with
the country fixed effects. Regression (6) uses therefore the second lag of the export
specialization variable.
We find very robust results in favor of a long-run relationship between trade inte-
gration and export specialization (−φ2/φ1)21. The long-run relationship is negative,
suggesting that the decrease in tariffs has led to more export specialization in Cen-
tral Europe. This result supports trade theories suggesting that trade integration
leads to a long-run concentration of activities across regions and across sectors. Fur-
19This is important because it suggests that our results are not driven by time trends common
to all countries.
20The correlation between the enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms variables is too
high to include these variables in 1 regression (0.72).
21Using a delta test, the ratio (−φ2/φ1) is significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.0006).
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Table 2: Impact on export specialization for Central Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.4*** -0.74* -1.02* -0.84* -0.4 -1.22***
(0.47) (0.44) (0.55) (0.51) (0.64) (0.47)
log(Exp spec.i,t−1) -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.35*** -0.56*** -0.39***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.1) (0.11)
log(tariffi,t−1) -0.49*** -0.58** -0.23 -0.41*** -0.84*** -0.32*
(0.15) (0.28) (0.25) (0.16) (0.33) (0.17)
∆log(tariffi,t) -0.21* -0.13 -0.14 0.13 -0.04 -0.06
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.08) (0.15)
nat. business cycle 1.47e-06 6.17e-07 -8.21e-07 -1.64e-07 4.12e-06 6.15e-07
(1.74e-06) (1.38e-06) (1.80e-06) (1.31e-06) (2.80e-06) (1.61e-06)
EU business cycle 0.001*** -0.0001 -.0001 .0006 -0.0003 0.001
(.0006) (0.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (0.0004) (0.001)
enterprise reforms - 0.28*** - - - -
(0.10)
competition policy - - 0.15 - - -
(0.09)
time dummies yes - - - - -
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 121 91 91 121 81 109
p value(F − stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
R2 0.40 0.4 0.35 0.58 0.46 0.31
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All models include country fixed effects and
time dummies are only included in regression (1). Regression (2) and regression (3) only take into
account 10 countries since data on institutional reforms was not available for Malta, Cyprus and
Turkey. In column (4) the regression uses constant export shares as weights for the tariff variable
and in column (5) the weights of the tariff variable are lagged by 1 period. Regression (6) lags the
level of export specialization with 2 periods instead of 1. note:***, ** and * denote significance
level of estimates at respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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thermore, this result holds in all columns of Table 2, indicating that the long-run
effect is robust to including institutional reforms variables, different weights of the
tariff variable and instrumenting the lagged dependent variable. In the short-run,
trade integration has no significant influence on export specialization (coefficient φ3
is not significant).
Regarding the institutional reforms, the estimation results of Table 2 indicate that
enterprise reforms have a positive and significant effect on export specialization.
This implies that an increase of 1 unit in enterprise reforms, leads to an increase
of 28% in export specialization. In contrast, competition policy reforms have no
significant effect on export specialization. This might indicate that stricter credit
and bankruptcy laws and therefore inducing restructures on a firm level, matters
more for export specialization than reducing dominant firms.
7 Robustness checks
In order to assess the robustness of our regression results in Table 2, Table 3 reports
some extended analyses.
First, the sample is reduced to the period 1994-2000 in column (1). This robustness
check excludes influences from a possible prohibitive tariff in the beginning of transi-
tion and the heavily restructuring period in the first years of transition. In Column
(2), the regression is only estimated for the EU10 to test whether Turkey, Bulgaria
and Romania, who have a different EU-accession path, influenced the results. The
results in Table 3 show that the long-run effect of tariffs on export specialization
holds in both cases.
Furthermore, an extra control variable for tariffs is included (HIB) in column (3).
This variable measures the non-published import barriers and quota’s. Since the
HIB variable is not significant, this implies that the tariff variable captures most of
the trade integration process between Central and Eastern Europe and the EU1522.
22Other authors tried to proxy non-tariff barriers by a frequency index but failed to find signifi-
18
Finally, when the tariff variable is replaced by an index of trade liberalization (col-
umn (4)) and an index of price liberalization (column (5)), both variables show up
positive and significant in the regressions. This indicates that more trade or price
liberalization leads to more export specialization.
cance (Amiti & Konings (2005) and Mayer & Zignago (2005))
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Table 3: Robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -1.56** -0.98** -0.96 -1.17*** -1.18***
(0.67) (0.5) (6.65) (0.42) (0.37)
log(Exp spec.i,t−1) -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.1) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
log(tariffi,t−1) -0.55** -0.63*** -0.54*** - -
(0.26) (0.17) (0.16)
∆log(tariffi,t) -0.19* -0.21* -0.18 - -
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
nat. business cycle -9.64e-07 5.25e-06*** 1.72e-06 5.36e-07 7.99e-07
(2.19e-06) (1.69e-06) (1.90e-06) (1.29e-06) (1.28e-06)
EU business cycle 0.002* 0.002*** 0.001 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
hidden import barriers - - -0.04 - -
(0.87)
trade liberalization - - - 0.09* -
- (0.05)
price liberalization - - - 0.12***
(0.05)
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
obs 87 88 114 91 91
p value(F − stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.58 0.37
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All models include country fixed ef-
fects, but are not reported to save place. Regression (1) does not include the years 1989-1993,
while regression (2) uses only the EU10 (not Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania). Regression
(3) includes a variable for hidden import barriers and the regressions in column (4) and (5)
replace the tariff variable by an indicator of trade and price liberalization respectively. note:
***, ** and * denote significance level of estimates at respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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8 Discussion of results
A recent study by Francois & Manchin (2007) examines the role of institutions,
infrastructure and tariffs in explaining why some countries trade and others do not.
The authors show that basic infrastructure (communications and transport) and
institutional quality matter more than tariffs for exports. This paper studied the
impact of tariffs and institutional reforms on export specialization. Our results show
that tariff reductions and enterprise reforms stimulate export specialization in 13
Central and East European countries. Moreover, we find that tariffs and enterprise
reforms are equally important for export specialization23.
Although export specialization makes countries more vulnerable to sector specific
shocks (Krugman 2000), specialization is not necessarily a bad consequence of trade
integration. The literature has shown that some sectors as the technology sector and
other high skill intensive sectors can cope better with sector specific shocks and have
a higher growth potential than low skill sectors ((Amable 2000), (Pedersen 2001),
(Koren & Tenreyro 2004) and (Golub et al. 2006)). A first glance at the sectors in
Central Europe in Figure 5, shows that all countries except Latvia and Romania24
increased their export share in the manufacturing sector at the expense of exports
in the agriculture and mining sector.
9 Conclusion
This paper studies whether the trade integration process in the course of the nineties
between the EU15 and Central Europe has led to more export specialization in
Central Europe. In addition, the impact of institutional reforms, enterprise reforms
23A test based on the R2 of the models shows that tariffs explain 5.8% of the model and enterprise
reforms explain 6.4% of the model.
24Romania increased its export share in the manufacturing sector and decreased its export share in
both the agriculture and mining sectors. Latvia increased sharply its export share in the agricultural
sector.
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Figure 5: Average export share in manufacturing sector for all CEECs
Figure 6: Average export share in agriculture sector for all CEECs
22
Figure 7: Average export share in mining sector for all CEECs
and competition policy reforms, on export specialization in Central Europe was
analyzed as well. We use a herfindahl index of export specialization to measure
whether a country is exporting in a small or a wide range of sectors and EU15-
tariffs to capture trade integration in a dynamic panel model. Our results lead us to
conclude that trade integration and enterprise reforms significantly stimulate export
specialization.
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11 Appendix B
As an alternative for the tariff variable, two EBRD indicators on trade and price
liberalization are used. These indicators lie between 1 and 4.33 according to their
achievement in reforms. The classification system for the trade liberalization and
price liberalization reforms are as follows:
Table 4: Trade liberalization
score Trade liberalization reforms
1 if there are widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate
access to foreign exchange.
2 if there is some liberalization of import and/or export controls; almost full current
account convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not
fully transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates).
3 if almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions
are removed and there is almost full current account convertibility.
4 if all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions are removed
(apart from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct
involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies;
no major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services;
full and current account convertibility.
4.33 if there are standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies:
removal of most tariff barriers; membership in WTO.
29
Table 5: Price liberalization
score Price liberalization reforms
1 if most prices are formally controlled by the government.
2 if there is some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market
prices for the majority of product categories.
3 if significant progress has been made on price liberalization, but state procurement
at non-market prices remains substantial.
4 if there is comprehensive price liberalization; state procurement at non-market
prices largely phased out; only a small number of administered prices remain.
Source: EBRD; Note: EBRD indicators are not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
12 Appendix C
Table 6 reports the correlation matrix for all variables of the empirical model.
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